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Savings and economic growth: a historical analysis of the relationship between 
savings and economic growth in the CAPE Colony economy, 1850-1909. 
LORRAINE GERYLING1, JOHN MWAMBA, GRIETJIEVERHOEF2 
University of JOHANNESBURG 
Abstract 
The sub-optimal savings propensity in South Africa the past three decades causes concern for the 
ability of the country to support its economic development. An historical analysis of the development 
of the savings’ trends in South Africa may assist in understanding the historical roots of the 
phenomenon. Apart from general descriptions of the nature of economic activity in the Cape Colony 
very little is known about the role financial sector development and savings played in the growing 
colonial economy. This paper explores the performance of the economy of the Cape Colony between 
1850 and 1909, through the business cycles, financial sector stability, the nature and extent of 
economic activity and seeks to explain the relationship between savings and economic growth. The 
question is whether the general view that ‘financial development is robustly growth promoting’ can be 
substantiated in the last half of the nineteenth century Cape Colony?  It contributes to the economic 
history literature on the colonial past of South Africa by using newly compiled data on the GDP of the 
Cape Colony during the last half of the nineteenth century. The paper finds that despite the 
expectations in the literature that financial deepening contributes to economic growth; the Cape 
Colony did not display such causal relationship between savings and economic growth in the period 
under review. The paper shows the different forms of savings in the colony and the trend of savings 
behavior in the period amidst the development of a relatively robust financial sector. 
Keywords: Cape colony, economic growth, financial deepening, gross domestic product, savings. 
JEL; N37 
1. Introduction 
There is an absolute dearth of a systematic understanding of the nature and extent of 
economic growth of South Africa before the formation of the Union in 1910. Economic 
historians have not yet attempted to compile the gross domestic product of the territories and 
colonies that formed the Union of South Africa in 1910. Apart from De Kock (1924) and 
Schumann (1938) who explored only aspects of the economic development of the pre-union 
economy, the extent of the GDP of the Cape Colony (and also any of the other territories 
and colonies since the seventeenth century) remains unknown territory. Even the latest 
attempt to produce an economic history of South Africa (Feinstein, 2005) affords only 0,02% 
of this attempt to the period prior to 1652 and another 0.08% to the period between 1652 
and 1913, since his concern is with labour and not the actual nature of the economy and the 
nature of its growth and development. Several studies explored the development of the 
banking system (Arndt, 1928; Jones, 1996; Solomon, 1983) but no investigation attempted 
to understand the relationship between the growth of the economy and savings. Schuman 
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(1938:37) relied on indices to illustrate the ‘general line of growth’ such as population growth, 
the volume and value of domestic and foreign trade, the development of transport and 
increases in banking activities. No GDP data has ever been compiled for the Cape Colony 
during the nineteenth century and no attempt was made to investigate the relationship 
between savings and the performance of the economy. The current concern with the 
underperforming savings propensity of South Africa (Mail & Guardian, 2012; Cronjé & Roux, 
2010; MISTRA, 2012) calls for a deeper understanding of the roots of the relationship 
between economic growth and savings in South Africa. This paper investigates that 
relationship in the last half of the nineteenth century in the Cape Colony in order to establish 
a point of reference to the savings-growth trajectory in South Africa. 
The South African financial system is widely acknowledged as highly sophisticated, but has 
also displayed dramatic changes recently.  Beck, Levin and Loayza (2000) assessed the 
effect of financial intermediary development on economic growth, capital growth, productivity 
growth and private savings rates. A robust positive link was identified between financial 
intermediary development and real GDP growth and total factor productivity growth, but less 
so between financial intermediary development and physical capital accumulation or private 
savings rates. 
 
In the current discourse about a higher economic growth rate for South Africa, a higher 
savings rate is considered a prerequisite. Higher savings is the trade-off between current 
consumption and future resources. The current savings rate in South Africa is discouragingly 
low. The question arises what the legacy of savings and economic growth was in nineteenth 
century South Africa? This paper investigates the following research question: What was the 
relationship between savings in the Cape Colony and economic growth during the last half of 
the nineteenth century? Does a causal relationship emerge between economic growth and 
savings? Since no comprehensive statistics are available for this period, a new dataset is 
compiled for the Cape Colony between 1850 and 1909.3  
 
In this paper an investigation will be conducted into the historical data on personal savings in 
the pre-1910 South African Cape Colony.  Historical data was collected on different types of 
personal savings, such as savings in savings deposits at banks, at savings and people’s 
banks, Exchequer and Trust companies and building societies. The Cape colony had a well-
developed financial system, through small local unit banks and later the British imperial 
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banks, which allows analysis on the impact of financial development on the economy, as 
well as comparisons with the more recent tendencies. The article will survey and describe 
the nature of financial markets in the colony and seek to explain the link between this 
development and savings and economic growth. The goal of this article is to examine the 
long-run causality between financial development and economic growth over the period 
1850 –1909 in the Cape Colony. It is important to determine whether financial development 
matters for economic growth and if there is evidence of bi-directional causality between 
financial development and economic growth or whether financial development led to growth 
in the short-term, but in the long term, it is bi-directional causality. This is important to 
understand that policies aiming at improving financial markets (economic growth) will have a   
significant effect of economic growth (financial development). 
 
The relationship between finance and growth has been a field of interest throughout the 
development of modern economics. There is consistent agreement that financial deepening 
and financial efficiency has a positive impact on growth. Economists have long debated the 
empirical importance of the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth. There are two distinct views of the finance-growth nexus in the traditional 
development economics. The first, supply-leading view was first proposed by Schumpeter 
(1911) who contends that services provided by financial intermediaries are essential drivers 
of innovation and growth. A number of studies have suggested that financial sector 
development is not only a good predictor, but also a leading factor in economic growth. The 
second demand-leading view suggests that the rise in the demand for financial services 
resulting from economic growth is the major driving force behind the development of the 
financial sector. 
The next phase in the analysis of the relationship between finance and growth is to examine 
whether the effectiveness of financial development in promoting economic growth depends 
on the structure or level of development of the economy. There are authors who conclude 
that countries at the early stage of development benefit more from financial development, 
see McKinnon, 1973; Fry, 1995). Odedokun (1996), Suleiman and Abu-Qarn (2005), 
Ghirmay (2004). Christopoulos and Tsianos (2004), Habibullah and Eng (2006) and 
Agbetsiafa (2003) mostly conducted investigations only in developing countries and found 
that in almost all their research, financial development contributed to economic growth. More 
recently, Zang and Kin (2007), Ang and McKibbin (2007), Güryay et al (2007), Odhiambo 
(2004) and Suleiman and Abu-Qarn (2007) examined the causality between financial 
development and economic growth in developing countries, and found no statistically 
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significant evidence of a positive causality running from financial development to economic 
growth at all. 
If it is found that there is a relationship between finance and growth, the more interesting 
question is in what direction does the causality between finance and growth run. 
Unidirectional means that only either the supply-led or demand-led hypotheses can be 
confirmed. Bi-directional causality suggests a two-way causal relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. In more recent studies results indicated that finance can 
also affect economic growth at a certain stage of development only to find the reverse later 
on. As real growth occurs, the supply-leading pattern gradually becomes less significant and 
a demand-following one occurs. Thus, in the early stages of development, financial 
development is expected to lead to economic growth, while the reverse occurs in more 
advanced stages of development. A country with a well-developed financial system could 
experience high economic growth through technological change, as well as product and 
service innovations, which will in turn create a high demand for financial services. As the 
financial sector responds to these demands, it will stimulate economic performance. 
 
2. A brief overview of the theories. 
The theoretical relationships between financial development and economic growth have 
been analysed extensively in the literature and can be summarized under four hypotheses. 
The following review of the literature is based on Chuah and Thai, 2004.  
The conventional view of the supply-leading hypothesis postulates that the direction of 
causality flows from financial development to economic growth. In a world with no frictions 
caused by transaction, information, and monitoring costs and perfect information, no 
financial intermediaries are needed. If those costs are sufficiently high, no exchanges among 
economic agents will take place. The need to reduce those costs for exchanges to take 
place has led to the emergence of financial institutions and markets constituting the financial 
sector. A well-developed financial sector provides critical services to reduce those costs and 
thus to increase the efficiency of intermediation. It mobilizes savings, identifies and funds 
good business projects, monitors the performance of an economy, facilitates trading, 
diversifies risks, and encourages exchange of goods and services. These services result in a 
more efficient allocation of resources, a more rapid accumulation of physical and human 
capital, and faster technological innovation, thus inducing faster long-term economic growth.  
In this article it is thus important to identify whether the cost of transactions outweigh the 
advantages of ease of transactions. 
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The demand-following hypothesis postulates that economic growth leads to financial 
development. Robinson already argued in 1952 (1952:67-142) that the development of the 
real economy induces increased demand for financial services, which in turn, generate the 
introduction of new financial institutions and markets to satisfy that increased demand for 
financial services. Demetriades and Hussein, confirmed this position in 1996.  
Third, the bi-directional causality hypothesis is a combination of the supply-leading and 
demand-following hypotheses. Greenwood (1990 and 1997) postulated that financial 
deepening and economic growth are mutually or bi-directionally caused (Greenwood and 
Jovanovic, 1990; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Greenwood and Smith, 1997). Financial 
deepening gradually induces economic growth, and this, in turn, feeds back and induces 
further financial deepening. 
Fourth, the independent hypothesis postulates that financial deepening and economic 
growth are causally independent. Lucas (1988) argued that, at best, financial deepening 
plays a limited role in economic growth, while Stern (1989) ignores the role of financial 
development in the growth process. Lucas makes a distinction between 'growth effects' - 
changes in parameters that alter growth rates along balanced paths - and 'level effects' - 
changes that raise or lower balanced growth paths without affecting their slope (Lucas 
1988:12). This is very similar to identifying a long term relationship and short-term 
adjustment process using a VAR, as will be done in the paper. Savings rates are seen as 
level effects (which transposes in the present context to the conclusion that changes in the 
discount rate, i, are level effects. Lucas disputed the idea that barriers to trade, such as the 
lack of financial institutions, act as a limitation on growth and the removal of the barriers to 
trade act as a key explanation of rapid growth episodes. According to the neoclassical 
growth model, removal of barriers is a level effect, analogous to a one-time shifting upward 
in production possibilities, and not a growth effect. The level effects can be drawn out 
through time through adjustment costs of various kinds, but not so as to produce increases 
in growth rates that are both large and sustained. Lucas argues the removal of an 
inefficiency that reduced output by five percent (an enormous effect) spread out over ten 
years results in simply a one-half of one percent annual growth rate stimulus. Inefficiencies 
are important and their removal certainly desirable, but the familiar ones are level effects, not 
growth effects (Lucas 1988:13 -15). Stern (1989) was critical of the idea of savings causing 
growth, due to the results of cross-sectional correlations only significant for richer countries 
(Stern 1989: 618-621). He emphasises the role of agriculture as a growth factor (Stern 1989: 
626 – 628). 
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3. Economic development in the Cape Colony. 
The economy of the Cape Colony developed as an agricultural economy since VOC rule in 
the seventeenth century. The Cape economy was the most advanced in ‘South Africa’ by 
1850. The total population in 1850 was 285 279 and rose to more than 2,4 million by 1909. 
All population data is compiled from the official population censuses done in 1850, 1853, 
1856, 1865, 1875, 1880, 1885, 1889, 1891 and 1904. No other official censuses were done. 
By 1865 67.19% of the employed Cape population was engaged in agriculture, and this 
declined to 64.19% in 1909. The indefinite (including children) and unemployed population 
changed from 90.32% in 1850 to 34.70% in 1904, meaning that 65% of the population was 
employed in 1904. 
Table 1: Population in Cape Colony: Total and Economic Activities. 4 
Year Total Population   %People engaged in: 
 Total Male  Female Employed Agricult Manufact Commerce Prof Domestic Indefinite 
1850 285279 141609 143670 27612 81.06 3.55 15.39   90.32 
1853 224827 
 
113240 
 
111587 
 
30943 74.25 3.14 22.61   86.24 
1856 267096 
 
  44055 76.35 3.38 20.26   83.51 
1865 566158 
 
290966 
 
275192 
 
130562 67.19 10.10 5.27 3.58 23.85 64.01 
1875 720984 
 
369628 
 
351356 
 
337914 61.89 7.18 3.94 2.34 24.64 53.13 
1880 876080 
 
         
1885 1252347 
 
         
1889 1458823 
 
         
1891 1525739 
 
766598 
 
759141 
 
       
1904 2409804 
 
1218940 
 
1190864 
 
1573719 64.15 11.30 4.4 2.43 17.71 34.70 
Source: CGH Blue Books, several. 
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Agricultural production consisted primarily of the cultivation of fruit and the production of 
wine, wheat, stock and sheep farming as well as small-scale maize and sugar production. 
The wine industry was stimulated by imperial preference under British colonial rule, but was 
removed in two stages between 1825 and 1831, which resulted in a drastic decline in wine 
exports (Houghton 1971:46). Wool exports soon replaced wine as the major export 
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commodity from the Cape Colony (Kirk 1980:22 -29). Agriculture dominated economic 
activity in the Cape until the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886, after which 
mining activities served to stimulate commercial and financial enterprise. The business 
cycles of the Cape economy subsequently reflected the boom and bust of wool farming and 
financial speculation brought about by the mineral revolution.  
By 1850 agriculture dominated economic activity in the Cape Colony and stimulated 
commercial activities in the coastal towns. The decade of the 1850s opened with yet another 
frontier war, which persisted until 1853. The economic impact of the war was positive, since 
it stimulated military expenditure by the colonial authorities in the region. Increased demand 
for subsistence goods stimulated businesses in Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown (Mabin 
and Conradie 1992). Around Cape Town agriculture was dominated by the production of 
wheat and to a lesser extent other winter cereals such as barley, rye and oats, fruit and wine 
farming, but the town itself was the main center for manufacturing and commerce in the 
colony.  
Manufacturing was elementary, such as brick fields; fish curing for export; flour mills; soap 
and candle factories; snuff mills and iron and brass foundries. Similar basic manufacturing 
activities were also conducted in the districts serving the dispersed farming communities’ 
needs for processing of agricultural products or manufacturing of farming implements, 
wagons, furniture or stone-quarrying. In comparison to neighbouring African territories the 
Cape Colony could be described as industrially advanced, but in comparison to the situation 
a century later, industrialisation was rudimentary, small-scale and dispersed. This was 
because transport was inadequate – the first railway line was constructed between 1860 and 
1863 between Cape Town and Wellington and Wynberg (Wickens 1983:204). Commerce 
was primarily restricted to the port towns – Cape Town and Port Elizabeth – and 
Grahamstown. In the port towns wholesale enterprises developed a lucrative two-way trade 
by importing manufacturing commodities from Britain and Europe and exporting wines, wool, 
hides and skins and ivory and other local products (Houghton 1971:3 – 4). Although most of 
the capital required for the development of the Eastern Cape had its origin outside the 
colony, the close correlation between the growth of the bank deposits and the expansion of 
trade and economic development in the region suggests that the area was generating 
substantial capital towards its own needs (Webb 1992:17).   
By 1850 a variety of financial institutions were offering savings facilities in the Cape Colony 
and expanded rapidly across the colony by 1910. No formal savings institutions existed 
under Dutch rule, but the first financial institution, the Lombard Bank, was established by the 
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Dutch East India Company in 1793 to address the prevailing scarcity of money in the colony. 
It was purely a loan bank which granted loans to colonists at five percent interest against 
mortgage bonds or other suitable security (de Kock 1924:21). When the Cape was colonised 
by the British in 1806, the dysfunctional Lombard Bank was succeeded in 1808 by the state-
controlled Bank of Discount. The bank accepted deposits from the public, primarily the 
agricultural community. Money was deposited on fixed deposit for periods of no less than 
three months at five percent interest on sums of more than 1,000 riksdalers (Arndt 
1928:486). A definite savings propensity was demonstrated: by December 1811 deposits 
reached 157,000 riksdalers and by 1823 1,400,000 riksdalers. These deposits facilitated the 
bank’s discounting for trade purposes (Arndt 1928:488). The Cape government used savings 
for short-term credits and encouraged saving among the poorer classes. By offering a 
secure savings facility at a reasonable interest rate, the government hoped to promote 
savings for old age and precautionary spending (Arndt 1928:488).   
One of the features of the post-slavery economic growth was the establishment of local 
banks and insurance companies, which resembled the British financial institutions 
demonstrating the influence of British immigrants to the colony. Financial deepening was 
beginning to take shape in response to improved economic performance. (demand-led) The 
first private savings bank, the Cape of Good Hope Savings Bank, was established in Cape 
Town in 1831. The stated aim of the bank was to mobilise deposits from all segments of the 
community, including tradesmen, labourers, charitable societies and even slaves. The bank 
accepted small deposits (as little as a sixpence) at an initial rate of four percent per annum. 
The growing economic activity in Grahamstown, Somerset East, Stellenbosch and Graaff-
Reinet led to the opening of branches in those small towns (Arndt 1928:489-491). In 1838 
the Eastern Province Bank was established in Grahamstown and in 1847 the Port Elizabeth 
Bank, signifying the thriving commercial activity in the Eastern Cape. By 1850 both banks 
had emerged as banks of deposit, mobilising the savings of more than only successful 
merchants. Webb observed: “As such, the banks’ role in fostering economic expansion was 
considerably enhanced, while the loan of such funds contributed significantly to the growing 
profitability of these institutions” (Webb 1992:6-13, 17). 
The economic upswing stimulated by the frontier war was followed by a recession, with 
adverse effects on the colonial economy. The severity of the recession was tempered by the 
so-called ‘wool boom’ of the 1850s. Wool exports, primarily to the central market in London 
(Kirk 1980:228), from the Eastern Cape alone rose from 1 961 175 kilograms of wool at a 
value of £212 166 in 1850 to 8 817 185 kilograms valued at £1 213 410 in 1860 (Webb 
1992:47). Newly established local banks which emerged during this boom period soon 
10 
 
suffered in the following depression – ten banks were established in the Eastern Province 
between 1857 and 1862 alone and by 1862 a total of 29 local banks did business in the 
colony (Schumann 1938:366). The 1860s was a period of “… intense depression … the 
state of trade in Cape Town and the colony generally, has been unprecedently depressed 
…” (SBA: INSP 2/1/7). A severe drought brought an end to the soaring wool prices (SBA: 
ARCH 1/4GMO) which led to a recession between 1862 and 1869, but by the end of the 
1860s the discovery of diamonds and improved wool prices ushered in an unprecedented 
upward trend in the business cycle (Schumann 1938:72-73). It was generally observed that 
the local banks had more capital than they could employ profitably, or “… far beyond the 
legitimate business requirements of the country” (SAB: ARCH 1/4GMO). 
Insurance companies had been active in the Cape since the beginning of the 19th century 
when British insurance companies began sending agents to the Cape. By 1897 more than 
50 foreign insurance companies were represented in the Cape alone. The South African Fire 
and Life Assurance Company, established in 1831, was the first South African insurance 
company. Others, such as the Cape of Good Hope Fire Insurance Company (founded 1835), 
the Equitable Fire and Life Assurance & Trust Company (established 1844) and the Mutual 
Life Assurance Society of the Cape of Good Hope (now Old Mutual) in 1845, followed suit 
(Vivian 1995:17-19). Premiums paid by policy holders constituted a special form of savings. 
By the end of the 19th century life insurance, protection against fire and marine insurance 
were the principal areas for which provision was made (Vivian 1995:21).  
Table 2 below illustrates the level of insurance performance between 1893 and 1907 in the 
Cape Colony. 
Table 2: Performance of Life Insurance companies, 1893–1907 Cape Colony 
 1891 1893 1895 1897 1899 1901 1903 1905 1907 
No of policies   
 
Foreign 
Local 
18 814 
 
9 518 
9 296 
22 534 
 
12 526 
10 008 
27 821 
 
13 184 
14 637 
31 873 
 
15157 
16716 
36 123 
 
16 995 
19 140 
49 720 
 
18 524 
31 196 
66 716 
 
22 268 
44 442 
83 010 
 
23 253 
59 737 
84 560 
 
24 939 
59 621 
Sums 
assured 
Foreign 
Local 
£8 734  
 
£4 340  
£4 394  
£10 181  
 
£5 590  
£4 591  
£10 806  
 
£5 762  
£5 044  
£12233 
 
£6 505 
£5 723 
£13 193 
 
£7 217 
£5 976 
£14 766 
 
£8 111 
£6 654 
£18 213 
 
£9 979 
£8 234 
£19 815 
 
£9 938 
£9 876 
£20 936 
 
£10 491 
£10 444 
Source: Cape of Good Hope, Colonial Secretary’s Ministerial Division: Returns under the Assurance Act, 1891, 
for the years ended 1891-1907 
 
Other financial service intermediaries emerged. The first trust company or board of 
executors in South Africa, the South African Association for the Administration and 
11 
 
Settlement of Estates, was formed by 22 Cape Town residents in 1834 and specialised in 
the administration of estates. The demand for their services led to the establishment of 
boards of executors in various towns in the Cape Colony. Between 1834 and 1899 about 30 
trust companies and boards of executors were formed, such as the Port Elizabeth 
Assurance and Trust Company (established 1852), the Graaff-Reinet Board of Executors 
(established 1856) and the Malmesbury Board of Executors and Trust Company 
(established 1864). These companies accepted funds on fixed deposit at competitive interest 
rates (Ehlers 2000:4-5, 29).  
The building society, established to provide savings for housing, was another English 
institution brought to the Cape Colony by British immigrants. The earliest building societies, 
developed on the lines of the British terminating variety, were established in Natal (1858) 
followed by societies in Port Elizabeth (1862) and Queenstown (1864). These early building 
societies evolved into permanent societies over time (Edginton 1951:21-23). The early 
terminating societies typically wound up as soon as all the members had been provided with 
houses. In the case of permanent building societies, they obtained funds through the 
accumulation of small savings in savings accounts and on fixed deposits (Edginton 1951:48-
50). The savings accounts offered by building societies could not be used as transaction 
accounts for withdrawals by cheque or draft and earned the lowest interest rate available 
due to the easy access to withdrawals (Edginton 1951:167). 
The commercial banking landscape changed when the imperial banks entered the Cape 
Colony from 1861. From this time on it is possible to consider the supply-led explanation for 
financial development. The London and South African Bank opened for business in Cape 
Town in 1861 and the Standard Bank of British South Africa was established in October 
1862 in Port Elizabeth. In the case of both these banks the motive for their establishment 
originated in the Cape Colony but the capital had to be raised in England. In contrast to the 
local banks in the colony, the imperial banks’ capital bases were considerably larger. The 
local banks were unit banks, restricted to one town or district and were set up with local 
capital. A large number of local banks were started with capital of £50 000 or less. There 
were, however, exceptions such as the Commercial Bank of Port Elizabeth and the South 
African Bank, which each had capital of £100 000 (Arndt 1928:241-243). These local banks 
served local needs by providing a limited range of services – fundamentally the same 
services offered by traditional British commercial banks. The banks facilitated commercial 
transactions and provided short-term credit to farmers and merchants, issued bank notes 
and accepted deposits.  
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The imperial banks had a much stronger capital base. The London and South African Bank 
and the Standard Bank were started with nominal capital of £400 000 and £1 000 000 
respectively (Arndt 1928:255-257). More imperial banks followed later, viz. the Oriental Bank 
Corporation (1873), the bank formed to take over the OBC’s business in South Africa, the 
Bank of Africa (1879) and the African Banking Corporation (1890). As pointed out, the 
imperial banks did not introduce new banking functions to the Cape, but operated as an 
extension of the English banking tradition. These banks’ functions were to provide short-term 
loans, collect deposits to extend loans and facilitate the making and receipt of payments. 
The innovations they introduced at the Cape were organisational and included larger capital 
bases, branch banking and limited liability (Jones 1996:3-6).  
The imperial banks could weather the depression of the 1860s and absorbed almost all the 
small local unit banks, assisted by their extensive and growing branch networks. There was 
considerable opposition to this concentration movement. By the close of the 19th century 
none of the local banks in the Cape remained in business, except for the Stellenbosch 
District Bank. The imperial banks accepted deposits only on fixed term on which interest was 
earned. These deposits found their way to the banks predominantly from the middle class in 
society (Jones 1996:94).  The commercial banks did not offer ordinary savings accounts 
then. Funds in current accounts represented the working capital of businessmen. Ordinary 
small savers thus lost the personal relationship they had with their local banks. 
The decade of 1871–1880 was a period of expansion and prosperity in South Africa. While 
Europe, the USA and Britain suffered a severe depression with falling general price levels 
between 1873 and 1879, South Africa was only moderately affected. The explanation is to 
be found in the expanding wool and ostrich feather industries, and in the late 1860s, the 
discovery of diamonds. Production and export of diamonds was rapid: between 1866 and 
1870 the average annual export of diamonds was £35 700, but rose to £1 306 000 between 
1871 and 1875 and to £3 242 000 between 1881 and 1885. By 1885 diamond exports 
comprised 40% of total exports from ‘South Africa’ at a time when the international 
economies of the USA, Germany, Japan and Britain experienced strong growth and 
prosperity. The Cape economy benefited from the influx of entrepreneurs, capital and labour, 
but also witnessed massive speculation in all spheres of business, especially by the banks. 
The 1870s was a decade of exceptional prosperity – diamonds brought new wealth, wool 
prices rose steadily and the production of mohair, hides and skins as well as ostrich feathers 
showed strong signs of growth. A spirit of optimism emerged when the Cape Colony was 
granted responsible government in 1872. The severe depression of the post-Franco-German 
war of 1870 impacted on European demand for Cape products, but did not stem the tide of 
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speculation and confidence. Schumann observed: in 1878 an unprecedented boom period 
commenced in South Africa, with the establishment of numerous new companies in the 
diamond fields. By 1881 more than £12 000 000 had been invested in the diamond industry, 
of which £6 500 000 was incorporated in the Cape Colony.  
Banks provided credit freely. In the speculative environment banks expanded credit freely 
and accommodation bills were in general use. Several other savings banks, such as the 
Kimberley Savings Bank or Good Templars Savings Bank (established 1878), Du Toit’s Pan 
Savings Bank (established 1879) and the Grahamstown Savings Bank (established 1873) 
opened for business in the colony (Jones 1996:494). The private savings banks established 
later paid good interest on savings deposits and catered for the smaller saver. The Good 
Templars Savings Bank, for example, catered for working men and encouraged saving for 
unforeseen circumstances and property acquisition. Available figures for this savings bank 
show steady growth. In its first year of business, 1878, the bank received £8 000 on deposit 
from 550 depositors. Deposits increased to £13 800 in 1879, £25 000 in 1880, £38 000 in 
1881 and £50 000 in 1882 (Worger 1987:155-156).  
Apart from the private institutions mentioned above, the Cape Colonial Government 
established another savings institution towards the end of the 19th century in the form of the 
Cape Government Savings Bank. Established in 1875 for the deposit of small savings at 
interest guaranteed by government, this institution accepted deposits in savings accounts of 
amounts not less than one shilling. The total deposit was limited, however, to £200 without 
interest and as soon as a deposit reached £250, including interest, no further interest was 
paid. After its first full year in operation, 1876, the bank had 31 branches, 576 depositors and 
deposits totaling £8 028. In 1883 the bank had grown to 58 branches, with 1 984 depositors, 
and it held £27 796 in deposits. In 1883 the government savings banks became part of the 
post office system and continued business on the basis described above. The interest rate, 
fixed by the government periodically, did not exceed five percent and was paid only on 
amounts in excess of £1. The Post Office Savings Bank grew steadily during the period 
under review, as can be seen in the table below. The growing use of this savings bank is 
also shown in the average balance held by each depositor. During its first year of operation 
the average balance held by each depositor was £20 (SBA GMO3/1/29, no.72/93). By 1893 
this amount had risen to £37.  
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Table 3: Bank Activities, 1884 -1909.  
Year No. Branches No. Accounts 
Open 
Amount at Credit 
& Interest 
£ 
1884 112 4775 93226 
1893 - 1894 231 38925 1133159 
1993 - 1904 345 99421 2447712 
1907 - 1909 364 101533 2125382 
Source: Arndt 1928:496   
Banks often granted advances to diamond companies on the security of claims and 
investors received advances on shares of the same companies (Arndt 1928:286-287). Total 
discounts of Cape banks rose from £5 389 000 in 1875 to £10 536 000 in 1881(Schumann 
1951:240-256). The cyclical prosperity was also supported by good production and 
international sales at high prices for wool and ostrich feathers. In 1871 the annexation of the 
Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR), two subsequent wars with the indigenous people (the 
most notorious were the 1879 Anglo-Zulu war and the first war of independence against the 
Transvaal Republic, 1880 -1881), acted as a stimulus for capital inflows from Britain (SBA: 
GMO 3/1/1/9: No 72/79). These wars disrupted society, caused massive loss of life and 
property, and also cost the British government £5 500 000. A substantial portion of this was 
spent in ‘South Africa’. The Cape Colony, where the imperial banks had their head offices, 
benefited most. Speculation in diamonds and land was rife. This over-extension of credit and 
speculation was bound to lead to a crisis.  
Banks cautiously started to contract credit in fear of liquidity problems, and the stock market 
showed signs of uncertainty. The war with the ZAR ended and independence was restored 
to the Transvaal Republic, but the first insolvency occurred in Grahamstown. Then followed 
a deep crisis: the “diamond crisis”. The depression lasted from 1881 to 1886. Insolvencies 
rose from 259 in 1880 to 1 000 in 1883 and remained in excess of 700 every year between 
1884 and 1886. Unsound banking practices resulted in heavy losses to the banks. Discounts 
of the Cape banks declined from £10 536 000 in 1881 to £3 000 000 in 1887. The severity of 
the depression was exacerbated by a modest recession in Europe and the USA, which 
ended in a full depression until 1886. The restoration of the ZAR independence ended the 
flow of British funds into the region and reduced purchasing power. A drought also affected 
the region adversely between 1883 and 1886 (Schumann 1938:282-286).  
The recovery was dramatic: with the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand, the structure of 
the South African economy changed fundamentally. Substantial capital inflows followed the 
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establishment of deep-level gold mines. Between 1886 and 1890 £22 634 000 was invested 
in the industry, but rose to £104 337 00 in 1900 and £121 488 000 in 1910 – 75% of which 
was foreign capital (Schumann 1951:169). A substantial proportion of this capital was 
directed through the imperial banks in the Cape Colony. The completion of railway links 
between Cape Town and Kimberley, and between the ports of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, 
East London and Durban by 1895, served to open the market and integrate transaction flows 
in an unprecedented way (Solomon1983:33, 53-54). The prosperity was accompanied by 
massive speculation, and banks again provided credit without insisting on prudent 
guarantees. By the end of 1887 270 gold mining companies were established and had a 
market capitalisation in excess of £24 million by the end of 1889. This upward trend in the 
financial cycle had to come to an end early in 1889 financial speculation collapsed and 
prices of gold shares and of land and prospecting companies crashed. In contrast to the 
1881 diamond crisis, the crisis of the late 1880s was purely of a financial speculative nature. 
An economic depression followed in 1890. Government revenue, imports and rail traffic 
declined marginally, but exports were not completely terminated.  
The depression in Britain in 1890 had a limited impact, and by 1893 the economy was back 
on track (Schumann 1938:87-90). Gradual economic contraction manifested towards 1896. 
Several factors had an impact on the contraction of credit: the Jameson Raid in 1896 
unsettled business confidence, the rinderpest cattle disease caused widespread cattle 
deaths, a drought occurred simultaneously and tension between the Boer Republics (the 
ZAR and the Orange Free State) led to the closure of the drifts, disrupting road transport of 
goods into the interior or outward to the coastal ports. When the political tension between 
Britain and the Boer Republics reached a point of no return, the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-
1902 broke out. This war had a devastating impact on the economies of the Boer Republics, 
and brought gold production to a complete standstill. During the war the economies of the 
Boer Republics were almost completely devastated by the ‘scorched earth’ policy of the 
British forces, while prosperity reigned in the two British colonies: the Natal Colony and the 
Cape Colony. 
The war had the expected impact on the colonies: war demand was pent-up, leading to 
massive demand for goods and services after 1902. British expenditure on a military force 
exceeding 200 000 soldiers (equal in number to approximately 25% of the entire South 
Africa population) provided a massive stimulus for consumption, trade and production. The 
post-war boom was short-lived, though, since a recession set in by 1903 and continued 
through a cyclical downturn that lasted until 1909. Schumann (1938) observed: “The sudden 
introduction of purchasing power from overseas and the accompanying remarkable 
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expansion of credit both in the Cape and Natal evidently caused the inflation of internal 
prices, and this, together with the large import of goods, meant flourishing conditions for the 
commercial and industrial interest, as well as the farmers of Natal and the Cape” (Schumann 
1938:93). This feeling of optimism resulted in the extension of bank credit, extensive 
speculation in land, massive immigration and an import drive. In 1903, 71 081 immigrants 
landed at the Cape ports, in 1904 another 42 938 arrived and in 1908 some 27 192 more. 
These immigrants were flocking to the British colonies and a territory of mineral wealth. The 
depression that followed was not caused by any particular recognisable external event, but 
was only a cyclical reaction forced by the massive economic disequilibrium. The depression 
was the most prolonged depression experienced in South Africa. It has been explained by 
the complete destruction of the interior, despite the relatively early return to production of the 
gold mines. 
4. Model and economic variables used in the article. 
4.1 Data and economic variables used  
Principal among existing econometric studies on finance and growth is the seminal paper by 
King and Levine (1993), which is in the tradition of cross-country empirical studies of 
economic growth. King and Levine (1993) identified four different financial development 
indicators: (i) the ratio of liquid liabilities to nominal GDP; (ii) the ratio of deposit money bank 
domestic assets to deposit money bank domestic assets plus central bank domestic assets; 
(iii) the ratio of credit to the non-financial private sector to total domestic credit (excluding 
credit to money banks); and (iv) the ratio of credit to the non-financial sector to nominal GDP 
(King and Levine 1993:717-732). In developing countries, a large component of the broad 
money stock is currency held outside the banking system. In principle, a rising ratio of broad 
money to income may reflect the more extensive use of currency, rather than an increase in 
the volume of bank deposits. Therefore, in order to obtain a more representative measure of 
financial development, currency in circulation should be excluded from the broad money 
stock, because it is not intermediated through the banking system. Following this principle all 
currency in circulation was excluded and only Paper currency in the banks (PaperC) is used 
as a financial indicator. 
National Savings (SAVR) has three components: household savings, corporate savings and 
government savings. No information on corporate savings is available, but since the data 
from banks captures all savings it was not necessary to distinguish between the different 
contributors. Savings were calculated as fixed deposits at banks, excess deposits in the 
different savings banks and the government surplus or deficit before borrowing. 
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In terms of data used, most of these studies used, as the indicator of economic growth, 
either real GDP or real GDP per capita, and in this paper the GDP (LGDP) is used, with the 
inclusion of the inflation rate as an additional variable. The population is excluded from the 
analysis due to the low numbers and also significant variation due to underreporting or 
inaccurate data collection. 
Other studies added certain macroeconomic indicators, such as interest rates, a price index 
that measures the inflation rate and indicators of other sectors of the economy. In line with 
Luintel and Khan (1999:381-387), the interest rate will be used to measure financial 
repression. A positive real interest rate increases financial depth through the increased 
volume of financial savings mobilisation, and promotes growth through increasing the 
volume and productivity of capital. In this article, the deposit rate in the United Kingdom 
(UKirate) was considered to be the nominal interest rate, since the banks in the Cape Colony 
were British-controlled. The consumer price index (CPI), trade openness through exports 
minus imports (Open) and the value of animal stock (Astock) (an alternative for financial 
savings) were added as variables. When the real interest rate is low, inflation is higher and 
the return on savings will be lower, but the investment in animal stock may be higher. This 
may lead to a decrease in financial savings and the impact on economic growth must be 
determined. 
The data compiled and reconstructed for the Cape Colony as used in this article, is in 
Annexure 1 at the end of the article. 
5. Model specification. 
 
This paper uses the vector autoregressive regression (VAR) model to explore the 
association and casual relationship between financial development and economic growth. 
The advantages of using the multivariate vector autoregressive framework in economy are 
that it can deal with simultaneity problem between financial development and other domestic 
variables and thus avoid the difficult task of determining which variables are truly exogenous, 
and it permits the identification not only of the short-term effect but also the long-term 
cumulative effect of financial development on domestic variables by allowing interaction 
among these variables.This method has been proven in the literature to be the best when 
studying this type of relationship (see for example Granger,1969), especially the ones 
involving tests of causality between variables. 
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In a VAR model, all variables are considered a priori as endogenous to allow causality in 
both directions (Sims, 1980). A VAR of order p i.e. VAR(p) can be written as:    
         (1) 
where: tY is a vector of endogenous economic variables, and 
  1 2,  Y ,  . . . , Yt t t pY    are the lags of tY .  
The model in equation (1) is known as the reduced form of VAR. A VAR(2) model (bivariate 
VAR) can be specified as: 
            
         (2)  
where: ty  and tx  are both considered as endogenous and exogenous variables 
simultaneously, and 
  1ty  and 1tx  are their respective lags. 
A VAR is a system of many dynamic equations; therefore it is important to inquire into and 
test the exogeneity of some variables with respect to others and to uncover what the 
feedback mechanisms are; this is what is termed as the Granger causality test (Granger, 
1969). In this case we can test whether tx  “Granger-cause ty .” The test involves testing 
whether the coefficients of tx  and 1tx  in equation (2) are statistically equal to zero. If these 
coefficients are different from zero then tx  “Granger-cause ty ”. This is what we refer to as 
unidirectional causality. Bi-directional causality occurs when tx  “Granger-cause ty ” and ty  
“Granger-cause tx .”  
All variables used in a VAR model are supposed to be stationary – i.e. integrated of order 
zero noted as I(0). However, when two or more variables in a system are cointegrated of 
order one i.e. I(1), a good approach is to use the standard Johansen test and model the 
system using a vector error correction model (VECM).   
The methodology used in this paper starts by identifying the order of cointegration of 
variables involved in the system. If the variables are I(1) and there is no cointegration using 
the Johansen test, then a standard VAR model on differenced variables is used. If the 
variables are I(1) and there is at least one cointegrating vector, then we construct a VECM 
1 1 ...  et t p t p tY Y Y    
t 10 12 t 11 t 1 12 t 1 yt
t 20 21 t 21 t 1 22 t 1 xt
y b b x y x
x b b y y x
 
 
       
       
   
 
(2)2 
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and analyse the structural relationship between the variables of interest. However, if the 
variables are stationary at level, we will then have to directly specify a VAR in levels and 
perform structural analysis. The variables used in this paper are: SAVR (the indicator of 
financial sector development), GDP (nominal GDP), OPEN (trade balance), PAPERC (Paper 
currency as an indicator of the M2 money supply), UKIRATE (interest rate in the UK), and 
ASTOCK (Nominal value of Animal stock). 
  
5.1 The stationary test 
Since time-series data used in the first stage of this research involves testing for the order of 
integration, by testing for stationarity. This requires the testing of the order of integration of 
the data set defined as the logarithm of the levels of the variables, the so called unit root 
tests. A stationary series is said to be integrated of order (d) if it achieves stationarity after 
being differenced (d) times. Many studies have shown that models with non-stationary 
variables tend to produce non-stationary results. This paper will employ the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) statistic to test stationarity. These tests will be conducted in three steps: 
firstly, it will test the model with only an intercept, secondly, with an intercept and linear 
trend, and thirdly a restricted model with neither an intercept nor a linear time trend, in order 
to determine the degree of integration of the data series. Table 4 presents the results of the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test of the various variables for the period 1856–1909. The results 
of the tests for all the variables and for the three different alternative models are presented in 
Table 4, first for the logarithmic level (the savings rate, UK interest rate and CPI rate are not 
logarithmed since they are expressed in percentages), and then in first differences. 
 
Table 4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test results  
Unit-root tests at logarithmic levels 
Variables Intercept Intercept and 
trend 
None: Restricted 
model 
Savings rate  -7.5476* -7.6683* -7.4542* 
GDP -0.8750 -3.4589* 2.9279* 
Open -1.5660 -1.9922 -1.3869 
CPI rate -6.4637* -6.4093* -6.5182* 
Paper 
currency 
-2.2992 -4.2507* 0.5903 
UK interest 
rate 
-5.0557* -5.3854* -1.4365 
Animal stock -1.4490 -2.8291 1.1375 
Unit-root tests at first differences 
Variables Intercept Intercept and 
Trend 
None: Restricted 
model 
Savings rate  -12.5170* -12.3912* -12.6409* 
GDP -6.5341* -6.4577* -5.9218* 
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Open -4.8704* -5.0128* -4.8282* 
CPI rate -7.2240* -7.2021* -7.3021* 
Paper 
currency 
-6.3323* -6.2695* -6.3355* 
UK interest 
rate 
-8.2065* -8.2065* -8.2859* 
Animal stock -5.2704* -5.2704* -5.1704* 
Note: * Denotes significance at the 5% level and the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationary. Critical values are -
3.560019, -2.917650 and -2.596689 for the first, second and third models, respectively.  
First differencing the series removes the non-stationary components in all cases and the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity is clearly rejected at the 5% significance level, suggesting that 
all the variable are integrated of order I(1). There is an exception for CPI rate, savings rate 
and UK interest rate, where the tests indicate that they are I(0), but the robustness of the 
models allows for the treatment of variables as I(1) and for the cointegration analysis to be 
conducted. 
 
5.2  Lag length selection 
The selection of the optimal lag length is extremely important and careful attention to non-
normality, autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and stability of the root is needed. The paper 
used several criteria in order to determine the maximum lag length.  
The sequential modified LR test statistic, Akaike Information criterion (AIC), and the Schwarz 
Bayesian information criterion (SC) were used in order to determine which appropriate 
maximum lag length to use for each variable.   
   
Table 5: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
 Lag LR AIC SC 
0 NA   48.1751  48.4534 
1  603.6562  34.4199  36.6461 
2  116.8941  32.7795  36.9536 
3  131.7758  29.4193  35.5413 
4  75.51244  27.1078  35.1777 
5   74.01620*   21.8367*   31.8544* 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
 AIC: Akaike information criterion  
 SC: Schwarz information criterion  
  
The model is initially estimated with a large number of lags, which are then reduced until the 
optimal lag length is found. The lag length suggested by AIC and SC is 5, but inspection of 
autocorrelation and normality of residuals in Table 6 indicated a lag length of 1 also to be 
optimal. The optimal lag lengths were chosen according to the LM(1) Lagrange Multiplier 
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version of first-order serial correlation test. Theoretically, a lag of one year makes more 
sense, since annual data is used. 
Table 6: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Lags LM-Stat Probability 
1  113.3623*  0.0000 
2  70.99169  0.0216 
3  52.83606  0.3282 
4  60.21505  0.1308 
5  99.22398*  0.0000 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 
 
 
5.3 The bivariate cointegration test  
After establishing that all the variables are stationary, the second stage of the research 
involves investigating bivariate cointegration utilising the Johansen maximum likelihood 
approach. Cointegration is a test to determine whether there is any long-term relationship 
among the variables – i.e. among the savings indicator and the explanatory variables (GDP, 
inflation, interest rate, openness, animal stock and money supply). In the identification of the 
model several technical tests need to be performed in order to obtain a correctly specified 
model. 
The Johansen maximum likelihood cointegration technique is used to test for the existence 
of cointegration as well as the number of cointegrating vectors. It allows the simultaneous 
estimation of a system involving two or more variables, and tests for the presence of more 
than one cointegrating vector in a multivariate system. Also important in the formulation of 
the dynamic model is to determine whether an intercept and/or a trend should enter either 
the short run or the long run or, or both models. The Johansen test of both rank order and 
the deterministic components is performed and the Pantula principle applied. The trace 
statistics and maximum eigenvalue test for all three models are presented in table 7. The 
trace test tests the null hypothesis of r cointegration vectors against the alternative 
hypothesis of n cointegration vectors. The trace statistic considers whether the trace is 
increased beyond the rth. The null hypothesis is that the number of cointegrating vectors is 
less than or equal to r. The maximum eigenvalue test, on the other hand, tests the null 
hypothesis of r cointegrating vectors against the alternative hypothesis of r + 1 cointegrating 
vectors. 
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Table 7: Johansen maximum likelihood cointegration test 
Trace Test Maximum eigenvalue 
Null  Alt 
Hyp 
Model 2 
No 
Intercept, 
No Trend 
Model 3 
Intercept, 
No trend 
Model 4 
Intercept, 
Trend 
Null Alt Hyp Model 2 
No 
Intercept, 
No Trend 
Model 3 
Intercept, 
No trend 
Model 4 
Intercept, 
Trend 
H0: r = 0 Ha :r = 1 221.7672  
(0.0000) 
187.3836  
( 0.0000) 
 411.6039  
(0.0000) 
H0: r = 0 Ha :r ˃ 0  86.1216 
(0.0000) 
 83.5050 
(0.0000) 
 257.7530 
(0.0001) 
H0: r = 1 Ha :r = 2 135.6456  
(0.0001) 
 103.8786  
(0.0123) 
 153.8509 
 (0.0000) 
H0: r ≤1 Ha :r ˃ 1  50.6573 
(0.0031) 
 43.4121 
(0.0203) 
 56.8986 
(0.0014) 
H0: r = 2 Ha :r = 3  84.9883  
(0.0107) 
 60.4666*  
(0.2213) 
 96.9523  
(0.0114) 
H0: r ≤ 2 Ha :r ˃ 2  32.6385* 
(0.0887) 
 26.6462* 
( 0.2828) 
 38.9414 
( 0.0425) 
H0: r = 3 Ha :r = 4  52.3499 
 (0.0708) 
 33.8203  
(0.5117) 
 58.0109  
(0.1411) 
H0: r ≤ 3 Ha :r ˃ 3  24.6189 
( 0.1482) 
 16.8435 
(0.5934) 
 26.4620 
(0.2097) 
H0: r = 4 Ha :r = 5  27.7310  
(0.2535) 
 16.9768  
(0.6418) 
 31.5489  
(0.4131) 
H0: r ≤ 4 Ha :r ˃ 4  16.7351 
(0.2492) 
 8.7623 
(0.8511) 
 16.7798 
( 0.4764) 
H0: r = 5 Ha :r = 6  10.9959  
(0.5425) 
 8.2146 
 (0.4427) 
 14.7691 
(0.5938) 
H0: r ≤ 5  Ha :r ˃ 5  7.8621 
(0.5643) 
 6.5745 
(0.5406) 
 8.2388 
(0.7996) 
H0: r = 6 Ha :r = 7  3.1338  
(0.5560) 
 1.6401 
(0.2003) 
 6.5303  
(0.3961) 
H0: r ≤ 6 Ha :r ˃ 6  3.1338 
 (0.5560) 
 1.6401 
(0.2003) 
 6.5303 
(0.3961) 
Note: r is the number of cointegrating vectors 
(Probabilities in parentheses) 
*Indicates the first time that the null cannot be rejected 
 
Both the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue test statistics reject the null hypothesis of 
non-cointegration (i.e. r = 0) at the 5 % level of significance. The trace test and probabilities 
indicates two cointegrating equations at the 5% level and the maximum eigenvalues confirm 
the trace test results. According to the trace test results, Model 3 is found as the best model 
for the analysis. The best model is thus one with an intercept, but no trend and two 
cointegrating equations. The maximum eigenvalues test confirmed Model 3 as an 
acceptable model, but Model 2 with no intercept and no trend and with two cointegrating 
equations is also recommended. 
 
5.4  VAR on Cointegrated Variables 
 
After identifying two cointegrating relationships among the variables in the system, we use a 
vector error correction model (VECM) that characterises the equilibrium relationship between 
our variables of interest, namely financial development and economic growth. The VECM 
model has two parts: the cointegrating relations part (cointegrating equations), which 
describes the long-run dynamics between the two cointegrating relations; and the VAR part, 
which describes the short-run dynamics between these variables. The coefficients of the 
cointegrating equations represent the speed of adjustment in response to a deviation from 
long-term equilibrium. The speed of adjustment can be useful for policy analysis. The output 
of the first part of a VEC model is reported in Table 8 below.  
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Table 8: Long-term relations from the VECM 
Cointegrating Equation:  CointEquation1 CointEquation2 
SAVR(-1)  1.0000  0.0000 
LGDP(-1)  0.0000  1.0000 
CPI(-1) 
 
 0.3682 
[ 3.8239] 
 0.0117 
[ 0.4413] 
LOPEN(-1) 
 
 1.28E-07 
[ 1.47656] 
-2.14E-08 
[-0.8974] 
PAPERC(-1) 
 
 11.3745 
[ 1.8097] 
 4.9284 
[ 2.8562] 
UKIRATE(-1) 
 
 3.4408 
[ 4.2380] 
 1.6075 
[ 7.2122] 
LASTOCK(-1) 
 
-6.8092 
[-3.0941] 
-3.4218 
[-5.6638] 
[ ] denotes the t-statistics 
 
The results reported in Table 8 show that there was a stable long-term relationship between 
savings and the GDP in the Cape Colony during the last half of the nineteenth century. The 
results show that in the long run, inflation, the UK interest rate, and the animal stock are the 
main drivers of financial development (saving) in the Cape Colony, while paper currency, the 
UK interest rate and animal stock are the main drivers of economic growth in the Cape 
Colony in the long run. The two more important variables that drove both the saving and 
economic growth in the Cape Colony were found to be the UK interest rate and the animal 
stock. This observation has a very significant implication: savings in kind other than in 
monetary assets constituted a substantial form of savings in the colonial context at the end 
of the nineteenth century. 
The results indicate that the trade balance and paper currency should be treated as weakly 
exogenous variables in the cointegrating model. Animal stock is a strong explanatory 
variable for both savings and economic growth, and clearly indicates the importance of 
animal stock in the developing settler colony during the last half of the nineteenth century... 
The presence of the two cointegrating equations between savings and GDP should be 
noted, although the direction of causality cannot be determined from these results. 
Table 9 reports the output of the second part of the VECM -- i.e. the coefficients of the two 
cointegrating equations as well as the coefficients of the short-run dynamics.  
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Table 9: Short-run dynamics 
Error Correction: D(SAVR) D(LGDP) 
CointEq1 
 
-0.5129 
[-2.5559] 
 0.0050 
[ 0.5268] 
CointEq2 
 
 2.2379 
[ 2.5063] 
-0.0309 
[-0.7291] 
D(SAVR(-1)) 
 
-0.4387 
[-3.1814] 
 0.0017 
[ 0.2642] 
D(LGDP(-1)) 
 
 2.4975 
[ 0.8108] 
 0.1988 
[ 1.3614] 
D(CPI(-1)) 
 
-0.0649 
[-1.2614] 
 0.0032 
[ 1.3014] 
D(LOPEN(-1)) 
 
-9.01E-07 
[-0.5272] 
-2.46E-08 
[-0.3030] 
D(PAPERC(-1)) 
 
 0.8098 
[ 0.1788] 
 0.3168 
[ 1.4751] 
D(UKIRATE(-1)) 
 
-0.3176 
[-0.4759] 
-0.0184 
[-0.5808] 
D(LASTOCK(-1)) 
 
-5.3677 
[-1.3539] 
-0.0083 
[-0.0441] 
 
The coefficient of the first cointegrating equation (identified as savings) has the expected 
sign (negative) and is statistically significant. This is an indication that there is a correction 
mechanism to any external shock that may affect savings. The magnitude of the coefficient 
of the first cointegrating equation suggests that the speed of adjustment is rather sluggish. 
Savings were not rapidly recovering from weakened economic performance. This slow 
speed indicates that there are some impediments to financial sector development. To our 
surprise, we found that the coefficient of the second cointegrating equation is statistically 
insignificant, indicating that there is no adjustment back to the long-run equilibrium position 
after a shock to the GDP occurred. This means that the late nineteenth century Cape 
economy was extremely volatile over the short run. Although we have found that financial 
development depended largely on animal stock and the UK interest rate, the most important 
question is whether this financial development led the economic growth or was it the reverse 
trend?  The answer to this question is found in the next section 
 5.5 The causality test 
Granger (1969) developed a relatively simple test that defined causality as follows: a 
variable yt is said to Granger cause xt if xt can be predicted with greater accuracy by using 
past values of the yt variable than not using such past values, all other terms remaining 
unchanged. 
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Here X Granger causes Y if any or all of β1,….βq are statistically significant. Using the 5% 
level of significance, then if any of the P-values for the β coefficients were less than 0.05, a 
conclusion can be made that Granger causality is present. If none of the P-values is less 
than 0.05 then the conclusion would be that Granger causality is not present. 
The null hypothesis tested is formally one of Granger non-causality. That is, X does not 
Granger causes Y if past values of X have no explanatory power for the current value of Y.       
H0: β1 =…. β2 = βq = 0 
The Granger causality test examines whether or not past changes in one variable help to 
explain current changes in another variable, over and above the explanation provided by 
past changes in it.  Engle and Granger (1987) show that if two series are individually I(1) and 
cointegrated, a causal relationship exists in at least one direction, but it does not indicate the 
direction of causality between variables. The direction of causality can be detected only 
through the error correction model derived from the long-run cointegrating vectors.  
The long-run causal relationship between financial development (savings) and economic 
growth will be determined through the error correction term. In this article the Granger 
causality tests are tested by the joint significance of the error correction term and the lagged 
variables in each VECM variable through a joint Wald or F-test, sometimes mentioned as a 
measure of strong Granger causality. 
Table 10: VEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
 Dependent Variable 
  
D(SAVR) 
 
D(LGDP) 
 
D(CPI) 
 
D(LOPEN) 
 
D(PAPERC) 
 
D(UKIRATE) 
 
D(LASTOCK) 
 
D(SAVR) 
 
 0.7916  0.0162*  0.0547**  0.7710  0.0376*  0.0468* 
D(LGDP) 
  
0.4175   0.2919  0.5905  0.9620  0.5165  0.0573** 
D(CPI)  0.2072  0.1931 
 
 0.0166*  0.2809  0.2041  0.0615** 
D(LOPEN)  0.5981  0.7619  0.9041 
 
 0.7158  0.9454  0.9244 
D(PAPERC)  0.8581  0.1402  0.2024  0.1186 
 
 0.0245*  0.9903 
D(UKIRATE)  0.6342  0.5614  0.2103  0.7194  0.2842 
 
 0.1459 
D(LASTOCK)  0.1758  0.9648  0.0323*  0.1016  0.3943  0.2624 
 
ALL 0.3157 0.2333  0.0002* 0.0979** 0.8788 0.0039* 
0.1608 
*Denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis of no causality at 95% 
**Denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis of no causality at 90% 
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Granger causality tests can be inferred either from the (joint) significance of lagged 
independent variables or from the lagged ECM term. Analysing the overall (joint significance) 
result row (ALL), no feedback or bidirectional causality exists for savings. Savings has no 
influence on any of the independent variables in the Cape Colony during the last half of the 
nineteenth century.. For the variable processes, however, the overall assessment is of 
unidirectional causality from the variables to savings, or that inflation, the trade balance, the 
UK interest rate and animal stock caused changes in savings. 
Similarly analysing GDP, the overall result row (ALL) indicates no feedback or bi-directional 
causality, but unidirectional causality is found from animal stock. This confirms a rather 
underdeveloped, immature economy and the large impact of animals as a store of wealth. 
Animal stock caused changes in GDP. This is significant in the predominantly rural 
nineteenth century Cape Colony. Bi-directional causality exists for inflation, the trade 
balance and the UK interest rate analysed by the joint significance of the lagged 
independent variables. 
.6. CONCLUSION 
The economic literature provided ample evidence that the improvement in financial systems 
contributes to an increase in efficient resource allocation and hence growth. This paper has 
used a multivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) framework in order to identify the 
relationship and the causality between financial development (savings) and economic growth 
in th e Cape Colony for the period 1850 till 1909. The VAR model found cointegration in the 
economy between Cape Colony savings and GDP, and through the VECM model a stable 
long-term relationship between savings and economic growth during the last half of the 
nineteenth century. The short-term feedback effect results indicated that in the case of GDP 
there is no automatic adjustment back to equilibrium after a shock, and that savings are 
mostly affected by Savings (t-1) and at a very sluggish speed of adjustment. This trend was 
clearly illustrated in the slow recovery of the Cape Colony after the dramatic international 
collapse in wool prices in the early 1860s, and later weakening in the terms of trade between 
the colony and the metropolis. The settler economy experienced limited financial 
development by that time and recovery depended on exogenous stimuli. 
Using the Granger augmented causality test, no causality were found between savings and 
GDP (neither uni-directional nor bi-directional) and the impact of animal stock on both 
savings and GDP was found to be uni-directional. The banking sector was unable to collect 
savings efficiently as a result of the single unit bank structure of banks and other financial 
services institutions, such as building societies or agents for insurance companies. The 
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financial services sector was unable to allocate these to the economy, possibly because of 
the lack of confidence in the banking sector, although efforts were made to attract savings 
from the economy, as indicated in the historical description on the emergence of a variety of 
financial services institutions. It was found that the economic shocks that hit the Colony in 
the mid-1880s affected the financial sector significantly, as the banks were capitalised 
overseas and responded to the needs of foreign shareholders as a matter of priority. A 
seriously weakened economic position of the predominantly agricultural population resulted 
in protracted recovery in monetary savings as well as an inability to grow the most important 
form of savings, namely animal stock. The adjustment period after the financial crises took a 
very long time, as confirmed by the short-term speed of adjustment coefficient. Furthermore, 
the real interest rate was almost negative throughout the period under review, which 
explains the sluggish domestic savings recovery. Even when the real interest rate returned 
to positive the expected economic growth through increased production volumes and 
improved productivity of capital, overall savings did not recover significantly. Finally, no 
causality between financial development (savings) and economic growth, as displayed in the 
economy of the Cape Colony during the last half of the nineteenth century,  suggests a very 
immature economy, an under-developed financial system and no or very little confidence in 
the banking system. The Cape Colony by 1909 has not yet reached the level of 
sophistication where financial development could affect economic growth. The results also 
underline the dependence of the Cape Colony on the agricultural sector of the economy and 
the dependence on animal stock as a store of value. GDP growth was fairly consistent and 
overall for the last half of the nineteenth century, relative to other settler economies, quite 
strong, but yet insufficiently diversified to generate broad-based savings across different 
sectors of the economy. The period since the mineral discoveries (13 years, including the 
disruption of the economically devastating South African war) was too short to have a 
notable impact on savings behaviour and the causal relationship between economic growth 
and savings. Further studies in the twentieth century will explore the future trend and attempt 
to establish under which conditions a specific direction of causality can be identified in South 
Africa.  
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Appendix 1. 
                                   Cape Colony Data       
Year 
Total 
Savings 
GDP 
(nominal) 
Trade 
balance 
Animal 
stock 
UK 
interest 
rate CPI rate 
Paper 
currency 
in 
circulation 
1856 15 211 1 560 098 -261 218 8 620 750 5.9 -5.37 265 850 
1857 30 849 2 282 675 -648 786 9 790 370 7.3 13.69 424 943 
1858 -65 058 2 146 506 -697 162 10 805 230 4.0 5.20 385 821 
1859 -157 716 2 523 258 -557 988 13 161 580 3.4 5.45 346 698 
1860 -204 319 2 641 870 -585 504 13 500 140 4.7 3.80 353 467 
1861 -169 671 2 687 933 -632 605 13 608 860 5.4 -3.26 376 760 
1862 -151 510 2 354 317 -828 167 14 228 120 2.6 3.56 357 955 
1863 -191 614 2 656 684 -51 387 12 080 030 5.0 21.96 289 713 
1864 -96 224 3 106 743 123 255 11 427 820 7.4 -13.05 312 529 
1865 2 045 326 3 054 451 111 663 15 778 260 4.8 -32.38 304 511 
1866 2 084 010 3 214 671 650 067 15 962 400 6.6 16.39 273 544 
1867 1 931 670 3 243 540 109 476 13 981 400 2.5 -1.81 257 954 
1868 1 925 453 2 902 220 350 544 13 304 730 2.8 -24.57 222 349 
1869 1 790 522 2 835 055 272 688 11 103 170 3.5 -19.60 223 521 
1870 1 771 512 3 250 658 217 456 11 414 540 4.2 -5.88 298 889 
1871 2 477 819 4 256 099 946 311 14 994 610 3.2 3.41 958 763 
1872 3 675 089 6 813 895 1 680 801 18 401 870 4.6 18.91 1 080 072 
1873 3 679 024 7 398 916 401 012 22 213 790 5.3 3.57 1 034 089 
1874 4 697 398 6 762 260 -19 468 25 137 350 3.8 16.35 886 697 
1875 4 895 572 8 003 416 23 859 31 791 130 3.3 0.83 695 105 
1876 4 133 575 8 614 759 -543 774 25 969 310 3.5 2.04 480 106 
1877 4 519 650 8 894 406 198 540 24 499 040 3.4 -16.21 518 918 
1878 5 802 172 8 969 954 -535 967 25 929 000 3.7 7.87 685 206 
1879 6 420 297 9 702 185 -698 314 26 456 380 2.9 3.12 721 469 
1880 7 582 081 12 728 236 47 333 27 875 180 2.8 -10.60 848 501 
1881 9 670 941 13 595 479 -830 263 28 297 170 3.5 4.22 1 257 486 
1882 7 971 065 13 936 823 -865 419 27 408 580 4.5 5.61 942 208 
1883 7 205 739 11 407 624 680 907 25 189 780 3.5 0.26 787 130 
1884 6 702 769 10 501 194 1 696 674 22 102 550 3.3 -2.72 708 797 
1885 5 233 107 9 163 773 1 038 540 23 454 280 3.1 -8.24 529 628 
1886 4 897 863 10 286 715 3 326 095 18 175 100 3.3 -3.69 506 532 
1887 6 163 229 10 784 423 2 822 839 16 272 220 3.1 -13.44 462 982 
1888 8 012 582 12 061 395 3 198 320 17 292 000 3.2 -11.86 662 107 
1889 8 903 787 13 668 953 823 017 22 615 700 3.9 -2.80 1 034 849 
1890 6 055 496 15 281 076 471 350 23 350 060 4.5 15.73 740 210 
1891 6 016 407 16 301 139 2 543 465 25 776 180 3.6 -0.03 489 609 
1892 5 855 073 16 633 895 2 490 826 26 034 750 2.6 -0.81 589 853 
1893 5 695 452 17 893 770 1 591 718 23 556 010 3.4 -3.11 1 091 517 
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1894 6 382 891 18 533 490 2 397 893 20 756 450 2.3 3.10 1 129 685 
1895 9 105 137 22 667 354 3 185 732 21 582 450 2.0 -3.96 612 266 
1896 8 910 659 23 970 202 -983 201 22 974 020 3.2 0.02 762 409 
1897 7 226 517 26 213 721 1 504 426 28 709 210 2.8 1.89 834 500 
1898 6 725 019 31 054 167 7 802 059 32 833 790 3.3 4.52 845 028 
1899 10 537 372 29 460 250 7 876 287 38 415 760 4.3 -8.98 1 120 460 
1900 14 106 734 15 813 851 -9 515 129 40 570 780 4.0 3.53 1 361 637 
1901 15 947 371 20 192 713 -10 696 381 42 270 650 4.0 -2.56 1 466 816 
1902 17 520 160 27 104 104 -15 728 326 50 719 060 3.5 11.94 1 583 316 
1903 10 350 213 33 785 911 -11 259 549 51 989 560 3.5 1.29 1 155 238 
1904 10 814 428 36 101 407 5 646 318 57 790 100 3.3 -21.79 1 064 091 
1905 11 379 032 41 996 645 14 008 246 54 717 770 3.2 -6.63 1 065 249 
1906 10 888 092 51 688 034 21 945 821 53 483 630 4.3 -1.00 1 111 180 
1907 10 296 711 52 709 766 28 917 658 47 775 450 5.2 5.75 920 021 
1908 9 751 329 48 548 752 28 271 704 47 044 610 4.0 0.10 934 729 
1909 9 416 270 52 082 903 31 962 242 47 282 230 3.7 8.99 1 084 629 
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